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The trade-o® hypothesis suggests that high wage inequality in the US and the UK and
high unemployment in countries of continental Europe are consequences of the same
negative change in the demand for the low skilled under di®erent degrees of wage
rigidity. This paper uses a labor supply and labor demand model with heterogenous
types of labor in order to test the trade-o® hypothesis and to analyze the e®ect
of market forces and wage rigidity on changes in the between-group variation in
earnings, employment, unemployment, and inactivity in France, the UK, and the
US between 1990 and 2002. The results provide clear evidence in favor of the trade-
o® hypothesis when France is compared to the US as well as to the UK. We also
¯nd that labor supply and labor demand are more wage elastic in the UK than in
the other two countries. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated model
reveal that exogenous changes in the relative demand for skills dominated in France,
while supply shifts had more impact in the US over the studied period. In the UK,
the opposite e®ects of the supply and the demand shifts were of similar magnitude,
even though the supply e®ects dominated for the least and the most educated.
In addition, an extended version of the trade-o® hypothesis is proposed which
considers not only wage inequality and unemployment but also labor supply. If labor
force participation is sensitive to wages, then rising wage inequality is likely to be
accompanied by an increase in the inactivity rate. We ¯nd that wage elasticity of
labor force participation is positive and signi¯cant in all three countries, and suggest
that depending on the institutions that a®ect wage rigidity, there is trade-o® between
unemployment on one hand, and wage inequality and inactivity on the other.
JEL classi¯cation: J21, J31, J64
Keywords: Unemployment and Wage Inequality Trade-o®; Wage Rigidity; Inactivity;
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collected by INSEE, was acquired from LASMAS-IdL, and Labor Force Survey with the UK data was
acquired from the UK Data Archive.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, labor markets in English-speaking countries and in con-
tinental Europe have su®ered from two contrasting phenomena: while wage inequality
has increased in the US and the UK, unemployment has been steadily rising in many
countries of the European continent. It has been proposed (see Krugman (1994) and
Blank (1997)) that the two phenomena have the same cause, namely decline in the
demand for the low skilled, resulting primarily from skill-biased technological progress.
The reason why the adverse shock to the demand for the low skilled has had di®erent
consequences in the various countries was suggested to be their diverse labor market
institutions that a®ect wage °exibility. This argument has been coined as the trade-o®
hypothesis, sometimes also referred to as the Krugman hypothesis. It states that in the
presence of skill-biased shift in the demand, there is a trade-o® between unemployment
and wage inequality, depending on the °exibility of the wage-setting mechanisms. This
paper explores the empirical relevance of the trade-o® hypothesis by testing whether its
predictions hold when the US and the UK, two countries with relatively °exible labor
markets, are compared to France, as a country with relatively rigid wages, over the
1990s.
We estimate a labor supply and labor demand model with heterogenous types of
labor, using a pseudo-panel of di®erent skill-groups constructed from the labor force
surveys of the three countries (Enqu^ ete Emploi for France, Labor Force Survey for
the UK, and the March CPS for the US) between 1990 and 2002. In the theoretical
model, the demand for di®erent types of labor is derived from a CES production function,
and the labor supply varies across labor types. The model allows for wage rigidity, and
consequently regards unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon. A system of three
equations for wage, employment, and labor force participation as a function of exogenous
supply and demand shifters, as implied by the structural model, is estimated by two-way
¯xed e®ects on group-level panel data. The classi¯cation of a skill-group is based on
gender, age, and education. We use linear and non-linear least squares, respectively, to
estimate the reduced-form parameters and the structural parameters of the model.
Both sets of parameters are used to test the trade-o® hypothesis. As for the reduced-
form coe±cients, the hypothesis implies that wages should be more sensitive to exogenous
changes in the demand than to employment in the US and the UK, countries where wages
are °exible, while the opposite should hold in France. The demand-shock sensitivity of
wages should also be higher in the US and the UK than in France, while the opposite
should hold for the sensitivity of the employment rate. In addition, in countries where
wages are fully °exible, demand shocks should a®ect employment in exactly the same way
as labor supply, while the ¯rst e®ect should exceed the latter when wages are rigid. As
for the structural coe±cients, degree of wage rigidity is directly estimated as a parameter
of the model and compared across the three countries.
There are few papers that test the trade-o® hypothesis explicitly. Bertola, Blau and
Kahn (2002) investigate the relationship between unemployment and wage inequality
using aggregate data for a panel of OECD countries. They ¯nd a strong and signi¯cant
negative relationship between the residuals from the unemployment and wage-inequality
equations, but only after controlling for country and period ¯xed e®ects. However,
1in order to explore whether there is indeed a trade-o® between wage inequality and
unemployment caused by di®erent degrees of wage °exibility in the presence of skill-
biased changes in the labor demand, as the trade-o® hypothesis suggests, it is necessary
to look at the data disaggregated by skills. Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999), the
closest antecedent to this work, analyze a long term change in the skill-speci¯c wages
and employment over the 1980s for France, Canada and the US. They reject the trade o®
hypothesis comparing France and Canada to the US. The only other work that analyzes
relative wages and employment rates in order to test the trade-o® hypothesis, although
in a less structural framework, is Puhani (2005). Focusing on the UK, the US, and
Germany, he ¯nds evidence in favor of the trade-o® hypothesis for the 1980s and 1990s
when comparing Germany to the US.2 The conclusions are therefore mixed: for di®erent
countries over di®erent periods and using di®erent methods, evidence is found both for
and against the existence of trade-o® between unemployment and wage inequality. The
relevance of the trade-o® hypothesis thus remains in question.
The present paper aims to add to this scarce literature not merely by providing
further evidence for another set of countries over a new period but also, and primarily,
by employing a novel estimation framework that we believe has several advantages over
the previous work. We focus on the year-to-year changes in wage and labor-force status
skill di®erentials using group-level panel data, comparing France, the US, and the UK
over 1990s. In contrast to the more general but reduced-form approach of Puhani (2005),
which is based solely on the interpretation of observed correlations between changes in
the relative wages and unemployment rates of di®erent skill-groups, we test the trade-
o® hypothesis using a structural model of skill-speci¯c labor supply and labor demand
with exogenous factors, in this respect following the approach of Card et al. (1999).
Their model is extended here so as to include additional supply shocks as well as a
new demand shifter, and the full structure of the model is utilized so as to describe not
only employment but rather all three labor force states (employment, unemployment,
inactivity) as well as earnings. In contrast to Card et al. (1999), the extended model is
applied to panel data and estimated in the structural form (as well as reduced form).3
Contrary to Card et al. (1999) we do ¯nd support for the trade-o® hypothesis when
comparing France to the US and the UK over the 1990s.
In addition to the previous discussion, we propose an extended version of the trade-o®
hypothesis, which focuses not only on wage inequality and unemployment but also on
labor supply. If labor force participation is sensitive to wages then rising wage inequality
is likely to be accompanied by an increase in the inactivity rate. If labor supply is wage
elastic, it follows that depending on the institutions that a®ect wage rigidity there is a
trade-o® between unemployment on one hand, and wage inequality and inactivity on the
other.
The estimation results are further used to construct counterfactual series that hold
either the supply or the demand shifters constant at their initial levels. These simulations
show what would have happened had there been no exogenous changes in the demand
2Among related works further belong Nickell and Bell (1995, 1996), Krueger and Pischke (1997), and
Gottschalk and Joyce (1998); they focus on the determinants of the changes in relative wages but not in
relative employment.
3Our methodological extensions of Card et al. (1999) are discussed in detail in the Appendix.
2or the supply. A comparison of the actual and the simulated series reveals which factors
stood behind the development in earnings and labor force status in di®erent skill-groups
in the three countries, and whether supply or demand factors dominated.
The tests based on the reduced-form estimates con¯rm the validity of the trade-o®
hypothesis and its extended version when France is compared to the US but have mixed
results for the UK. Wages are more sensitive than employment to the demand shocks in
the US, while the opposite is true for France as well as the UK. Cross-country comparison
also shows that the demand-shock sensitivity of wages is higher, while demand-shock
sensitivity of employment is lower in the US than in the other two countries. The
demand shock has an equal e®ect on employment and labor supply in the US as well as
in the UK, suggesting that there is full wage °exibility in the two countries. The mixed
reduced-form results for the UK are reconciled by the structural estimation, which reveals
that both labor supply and labor demand are signi¯cantly more wage elastic in the UK
than in the other two countries, which explains the observed insensitivity of wages and
sensitivity of employment to demand shocks in this country.
Structural results provide further evidence in favor of the trade-o® hypothesis. The
estimate of the wage °exibility parameter is lower in France than in the other two
countries. We therefore conclude that institutions that enhance wage rigidity played
an important role in the earnings and labor force status developments in France during
the period under analysis. The positive and signi¯cant values of the wage elasticity of
labor force participation for all three countries suggest that the high inactivity rates in
the US and the UK, in particular among low-skilled men, could be a consequence of
the continuing deterioration of the relative wages of the low skilled, as proposed by the
extended trade-o® hypothesis.
Simulations based on the estimated model show that exogenous changes in the
demand dominated for the employment rates across all education groups in France, while
supply shifts had more impact in the US. In the UK, the opposite e®ects of the supply
and the demand shifts were of similar magnitude, with the supply e®ects dominating for
the least and the most educated.
This paper has the following structure: The introduction is followed by a section that
describes the trade-o® hypothesis and its extended version in the context of the three
countries analyzed here. The next two sections present the structural model and the
estimation strategy, respectively. The subsequent section discusses the main ¯ndings.
It is followed by the conclusion. The Appendix consists of six parts: data description
and sources; ¯gures; other results; model details; estimation details; and the detailed
discussion of this paper's extensions of Card at al. (1999).
2 Trade-o® Hypothesis and Its Extension
The trade-o® hypothesis is based on a simple static model of labor supply and labor
demand, as given in Figure 1. The ¯gure shows the e®ect of the adverse demand shift on
the relative earnings and employment of the low skilled (relative to the high skilled) in a
country where wages are rigid, such as France, and in a country where wages are °exible,
such as the US. In other words, when wages adjust, negative change in the demand for



















the low skilled is likely to a®ect their wages rather (or more) than their employment,
whereas in an economy where wages are rigid the adverse demand e®ect will be entirely
pronounced in the rise of the unemployment of the low skilled.
In the extreme case, when labor supply is wage inelastic, the adverse demand shift
in °exible labor market a®ects only wages while employment remains at its initial
level.4 However, when labor supply is not perfectly inelastic, in countries with high
wage °exibility, the deterioration of relative wages of the low skilled may reduce their
incentives to work. As shown in Figure 1, although, in countries where wages fully
adjust, the resulting unemployment caused by the adverse demand shift is lower (or even
zero, as in this case), inactivity among the low skilled rises in response to the decline in
their relative wages, leaving the gap between the employment rate in the countries with
rigid and °exible wages, such as France versus the US, smaller than the original trade-o®
4 Labor supply in Figure 1 and in the context of this paper corresponds to labor force participation,
and in what follows the two terms will be used interchangeably.
4hypothesis would suggest.5 The ¯rst point we would like to make is that if labor supply,
de¯ned as labor force participation, is not perfectly wage inelastic, then the standard
trade-o® hypothesis is incomplete. In what follows an extended version of the trade-o®
hypothesis is proposed that does take into account the e®ect of wages on inactivity. In
addition to what the standard trade-o® hypothesis suggests, the extended version states
that if labor supply is sensitive to wages then the increase in wage inequality and the
deterioration of absolute or relative wages of the low skilled in countries where wages
are °exible are likely to be accompanied by an increase in inactivity. In this sense,
depending on the labor market institutions, the trade-o® that the policy-makers may
face is the choice between rising wage inequality as well as inactivity rates on one hand
and rising unemployment on the other.
France, the UK and the US, which are the focus of this analysis, represent economies
with di®erent degrees of labor market regulations and wage °exibility, with the US as the
most °exible and France as the least. These two countries also seem to ¯t at an aggregate
level into the argument of the trade-o® hypothesis, as the US has experienced high and
rising wage inequality and low and declining unemployment, while the opposite has been
true for France. The 90th to 10th percentile of the wage distribution of men increased
from 4.4 to 4.8 and that of women increased from 3.7 to 4.1 in the US between 1990
and 2000, according to the OECD statistics. In France, wage inequality declined from
3.5 to 3.3 for men and from 2.9 to 2.7 for women, using the same measure. The average
overall unemployment rate during the same period was 10.8 percent in France, but only
5.5 percent in the US, and it has been rising in France, while there was a declining trend
in the US. The UK seems to be somewhere in between, as its rising wage inequality
was complemented by a relatively high unemployment until the mid-1990s. The rise in
wage dispersion in the UK was somewhat slower than in the US { from 3.3 to 3.4 for
men and from 2.9 to 3.1 for women { whereas the average unemployment rate there was
7.8 percent, and also had a tendency to decline. The observed cross-country di®erences
in the levels of unemployment and wage dispersion seem therefore consistent with the
predictions of the standard trade-o® hypothesis.
The average inactivity rate among prime age men between 1990 and 2000 was only 5.1
percent in France, while it was 7.2 percent in the UK and 7.8 percent in the US. Although
it had an upward trend in all three countries, it increased the least in France and the
most in the US. If we add up the unemployed and the inactive, the total non-employment
rate among prime age men { and this deserves to be emphasized { was similar across the
three countries in the period under analysis. Thus, the average employment rate (one
minus the non-employment rate) among prime age men during the 1990s was also similar
in the three countries: 87.1 percent in France, 85.9 percent in the UK and 88 percent
in the US. The labor force participation and inactivity of women traditionally re°ects
social and cultural values, as well as economic factors. The average inactivity rate of
prime age women in the three countries were 23.5 percent in France, 25.6 percent in the
UK and 24.5 percent in the US.
5 In this context, inactivity is the state of voluntary non-employment, i.e. when a non-working
individual declines to seek employment. This state is also often called labor force non-participation.
These two terms will be used interchangeably.
5Figure 2: Employment Rate
































Prime age men (M) and women (W) in France, the UK and the US (out-of-school civilians of age 25-54).
Source: OECD.
Figure 3: Labor Force Participation Rate













































Prime age men (M) and women (W) in France, the UK and the US (out-of-school civilians of age 25-54).
Source: OECD.
6Employment rates for both men and women for the three countries in the studied period
are shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 illustrates how the cross-country di®erences in inactivity
versus unemployment are re°ected in the three countries' labor force participation rates:
we can see that labor force participation of French men and women is higher by several
percentage points than the corresponding rates of men and women in the two other
countries. However, the higher inactivity rates in the US and the UK \make up" for the
greater proportion of unemployed in France, leaving the employment rates (in particular
among men) similar, as was indicated in Figure 2. The observed cross-country di®erences
even seem to suggest that there is a trade-o® between unemployment and inactivity. The
relatively high inactivity rates among prime age men in the US and the UK (i.e. countries
with high wage °exibility) when compared to France, are consistent with the extended
version of the trade-o® hypothesis.
Although the trade-o® hypothesis and its extended form seem to have some empirical
relevance when looking at the aggregate data for the three countries during the studied
period, in order to test the validity of these theories, it is necessary to have the labor
force status data disaggregated for di®erent earning levels and focus on the changes in
the relative labor market outcomes for the di®erent skill-groups, which is the approach
we follow in this analysis.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 The Model
The theoretical framework of the present analysis is based on a simple model of labor
supply and labor demand with heterogenous labor. The model is a variation of that
in Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999). It treats unemployment as a disequilibrium
phenomenon caused by labor market institutions that prevent wages from being equal to
their market clearing values. While Card et al. (1999) apply the model to a single long
term change in wages and employment over the entire 1980s (focusing on France, Canada
and the US), this paper uses an extended version of the model in order to explore the
year-to-year changes observed in the panel data of di®erent skill-groups for France, the
UK, and the US over the 1990s.6 As this is a static model, time subscripts are omitted,
and the same equations are assumed to hold in every year of the analysis. The empirical
application, as described in the next section, allows certain parameters to change over
time through the year ¯xed e®ects.
In this model, population is composed of J labor types that di®er both in skills and
reservation wages.7 A single homogenous product Y is produced in the whole economy
from J labor inputs according to a constant returns CES production function, as follows








6The present work's extensions of Card at al. (1999) are discussed in detail in Section F of the
Appendix.
7 In what follows, we will refer to the groups of the di®erent labor types as \skill-groups". The
empirical analysis de¯nes a skill-group on the basis of gender, age and education.
7where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between any two inputs, and cj is the relative
e±ciency parameter for skill-group j. The labor demand for input j, implied by this
production function, is
ln(Ld
j) = ln(Y ) ¡ ¾ ln(wj) + (¾ ¡ 1) ln(cj) (2)
where wj is the wage the economy pays on average to labor type j. Divided by the total
number of individuals in the group and including the error term, the labor demand for
skill-group j becomes
ln(l d






Pj is the proportion of individuals in group j who are employed, pj =
Pj
P is
the proportion of labor type j in population, y = Y
P is the per capita output, and º d
j is
the error term in the labor demand equation.
The labor supply of the skill-group j depends on the average wage o®er wj for the
labor type j, and two exogenous factors that a®ect the decision to work: marital status
and presence of pre-school age children. The two factors are expressed in proportions
and therefore re°ect the typical family characteristics of the individuals of the particular
labor type.8 An individual of the labor type j is therefore assumed to make the standard
decision whether to supply her labor or not by comparing wj (the unconditional expected
wage she would receive if entering the labor market) and the reservation wage determined
by her preferences and her outside options and costs given by her marital status and the
presence of children. The labor supply of the labor type j is described by the participation
rate lS
j , which is the proportion of individuals in group j that are in the labor force, and







j exp(®j + ¯ g mj + ° g kj) (4)
where " is the wage elasticity common to all groups, ®j is the time-invariant group-speci¯c
heterogeneity in preferences, mj is the proportion of individuals who are married, and kj
is the proportion of individuals living in households that include pre-school age children.
As common knowledge and previous empirical ¯ndings suggest, marital status and the
presence of pre-school children typically a®ect women and men in a di®erent, and often
quite opposite, ways. The coe±cients of these two factors are therefore assumed to di®er
by gender, where g = f for the skill-groups of women, and g = m for the skill-groups
of men. Expressed in logarithms, and including the error term º s
j , the labor supply is
given by
ln(l s
j ) = ®j + " ln(wj) + ¯ g mj + ° g kj + º s
j (5)
8 It can be questioned whether the two factors are truly exogenous to the model. This issue and the
sensitivity of the results to their presence in the analysis will be discussed later.
9 As the labor supply in this model is de¯ned as the proportion of individuals in the labor force, in
what follows we use the terms labor supply and labor force participation interchangeably.
8The market clearing wage w¤
j for group j is de¯ned as
l s
j (w¤
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When the market clears, the actual wage equals the market clearing wage, and as supply
equals demand, there is no unemployment.10 The labor force participation rate and the
employment rate are equal in this case.
In the presence of labor market institutions that limit wage °exibility, the actual wage
may di®er from its market clearing value. We do not model the way the actual wage is
set, but we only specify the following general (reduced-form) relationship between the
actual and the market clearing wage for group j
ln(wj) = ´ + !j + ½ ln(w¤
j) + º w
j (8)
where ½ 2 h0;1i is a coe±cient of wage °exibility,11 whereas !j and ´ represent the
time-invariant group-speci¯c and the time-variant overall institutional e®ects, respec-
tively.12 Equation 8 is one of the most restrictive features of the model. We discuss the
assumptions that stand behind this equation, together with the other simpli¯cations of
the model, at the end of this section.
When the actual wage di®ers from the market-clearing wage, market doesn't clear.
This means that the employment rate is determined either by the labor supply or by
the labor demand, whichever of the two is smaller. If labor supply exceeds the labor
demand, unemployment among individuals of labor type j is given by
uj ´ l s
j ¡ l d
j (9)
Note that uj is de¯ned here as the fraction of unemployed in the population of group j,
rather than in their labor force, as it would be in the traditional de¯nition of the unem-
ployment rate. The empirical fact that at any point in time there is some unemployment
observed in each skill-group, suggests within this theoretical framework that the actual
wage is always above the market clearing wage, ln(wj) > ln(w¤
j) and the employment in
group j is given by the demand
ej ´ l d
jt (10)
10 The theoretical model assumes away frictional and other types of systemic unemployment. The
empirical application however allows for additional time-invariant group-speci¯c and year-speci¯c group-
invariant components in unemployment as well as components in other variables through two way ¯xed
e®ects.
11 Note that expressed in changes over time and assuming that ¢´ = 0 (no institutional change) and
no shocks, ¢ln(wj) = ½ ¢ln(w
¤
j). ½ also represents the proportion of the actual wage that corresponds
to the market clearing wage.
12 As many policy changes a®ect only some of the skill-groups, there should ideally be time-varying
group-speci¯c institutional e®ects as part of the resulting actual wage. Unfortunately, the present model
speci¯cation and the estimation strategy does not allow the group-speci¯c e®ects to vary over time. See
the discussion in the text that follows.
9If we de¯ne the proportion of inactive in group j as nj, we can write down an identity
relationship that states that the proportions in the three labor force states in group j
must add to one
ej + uj + nj ´ 1 (11)
Equations 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 describe the theoretical model of the present analysis.
3.2 The Main Simpli¯cations of the Model
The theoretical model makes several restrictive assumptions that should be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.13 Equation 8, which de¯nes the relationship between the
actual and the market-clearing wage, captures the three major simpli¯cations. First,
there are no equilibrating tendencies in this disequilibrium model. The actual wage is a
function of the current market-clearing wage, but it does not depend in any way on the
past gaps between the two. The choice of a static model for the present analysis rules out
the possibility of incorporating any gradual adjustment towards the equilibrium. Allow-
ing for the dynamic features would substantially change the entire set-up of the model
and make its estimation in the given empirical set-up much more complex. Although
the focus here is on the year to year changes, the analysis regards these as sequential
point-in-time snapshots of the outcomes of the supply and demand forces on wages and
labor force status.
Second, the coe±cient ½ that describes the sensitivity of the actual wage to the
market-clearing wage, is restricted to be the same for all the skill-groups. This assump-
tion is required for the model to be estimable in the present form. It suggests that all the
skill-groups experience a similar degree of wage rigidity. This would be violated if wages
of the least skilled were a®ected by the labor market institutions to a greater extent
than the wages of the high skilled, as for example in case of the e®ect of minimum wage.
On the other hand, imposing ½ to be the same across groups is consistent with the fact
that in several European countries, wages at all levels are determined by negotiations
of the relevant parties (employers, unions or other employees' interest groups, and the
governments) rather than by the market.14 Industry-wide collective bargaining in France
is an example of such centralized wage-setting mechanism and possibly justi¯es the use
of this model to explore wage rigidity in this country. The responsiveness of the actual
wages to the market forces (as captured by the market-clearing wage) are more likely to
be similar across di®erent skill-groups in the French labor market.
This assumption can in principle be relaxed by allowing ½ to di®er for certain groups,
in a similar manner as the marital-status and the presence-of-children coe±cients in the
labor supply equation are allowed to vary by gender. However, the choice of the varia-
tion15 would be arbitrary, and the extension would require adding more coe±cients to
13 These are the necessary assumptions that keep the theoretical model manageable and enable us to
estimate it with the available data.
14 There are di®erent degrees of centralization of this process in di®erent countries, as the negotiations
take place at the nation, industry or ¯rm levels
15 The estimation strategy does not allow group-speci¯c ½, so it is necessary to choose the set of the
skill-groups for which it will be the same.
10the model which (with the group and year e®ects) is already almost over-parameterized.
Third, although the gap between the actual and the market-clearing wage can change
over time in aggregate (through ºt), the skill-group variation in this gap (captured by
!j) stays constant. Again, this assumption is likely to be violated due to the di®erent
e®ect of the labor market institutions across skill-groups. The main justi¯cation here is
again the centralized wage negotiations that would maintain the cross-group di®erences
the same.16 A possible way of relaxing the last assumption is to include in equation 8 all
the other time-varying exogenous factors that are in the model, without imposing any
structural restrictions on their coe±cients.17 This would make the relationship of the
actual and the market-clearing wage more °exible. To some extent, the presence of the
other time-varying exogenous factors could also capture the adjustment process towards
equilibrium and therefore relax (but only in the estimation, not structurally) the absence
of the equilibrating forces discussed above. However, in this case, neither the structural
parameters, nor the reduced-form coe±cients describing the impact of the supply and
demand shocks on wages and labor force status proportions could be identi¯ed.
In addition to the restrictions imposed by equation 8, other simpli¯cations of the
model include the same elasticity of substitution between any two of the skill-groups, the
common wage elasticity of the labor force participation for all the skill-groups, and the
production of one homogenous product. Again, these are the assumptions necessary to
render the model estimable.
3.3 Structure and the Reduced Form
The structural model, as described by equations Equations 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11, leads
to a reduced-form system of equations of the four endogenously determined variables
(wage wj, the proportions of employed ej, unemployed uj, and inactive nj in group j),
stated as functions of the exogenous factors. As the three equations for the labor force
status proportions add to one, one of them is redundant. If we express the endogenous
factors in logarithmic form, and use, as a left-hand-side variable, the logarithm of labor
supply ln(l s
j ), that equals ln(ej + uj), rather than unemployment or inactivity, the
model can be written as a system of three linear equations. We assume that the model
describes the state of economy in each year of the analysis, with the coe±cients of the
key explanatory variables constant overtime. All other group-invariant parameters of the
model are allowed to change. Adding the time subscripts accordingly, the model can be
estimated using group-level panel data with group-speci¯c and year-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects
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16 This is again violated by the speci¯c e®ect of the minimum wage on the low skilled. However, the
indexation of the minimum wage to the average manufacturing wage in France supports the plausibility
of the constant gaps at least for certain groups at the lower half of the distribution.
17 They already enter the equation structurally through the market clearing wage w
¤
j.





k (where i 2 w;e;s) di®er by gender (g = f;m). The »-s represent the reduced-
form error terms that are functions of some of the structural parameters and the error
terms º d
j , º s
j , and º w
j .
Similar to Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999),18 we substitute the relative e±ciency
parameters cjt, which are not observed, with an instrument ~ cjt, assuming that the
relationship between the instrument and the unobserved variable is as follows
ln(cjt) = ¸0t + ¸ ln(~ cjt) + º c
jt (15)
where ¸0t is a time-variant parameter, ¸ describes the mapping from percentage changes
in the instrument to percentage changes in cjt, and º c
jt is the error term, which is assumed
to be independent of the instrument and all other right hand side variables in the three
equations. Thus, the actual reduced-form coe±cients of the exogenous demand shifter
that are estimated in the three equations, are ¼ i
~ c = ¸ ¼ i
c and ~ ¼ i
0t = ¼ i
0t + ¼ i
c ¸0t, and
the reduced-form error terms ~ » i
jt = » i
jt + ¼ i
c º c
jt where i 2 w;e;s. The instrument used
to proxy the exogenous demand shifter cjt is described in the next section.
The reduced-form coe±cients in the system of equations are functions of the
Table 1: Mapping of the Reduced-Form to the Structural Parameters



















































































structural parameters: ¾, ", ½, ¯ f, ¯ m, ° f, ° m, ®j, !j, ln(yt), and ´t. Table 1 shows
the correspondence between the reduced-form and the structural parameters for the key
coe±cients of the model, which are to be estimated. The three columns describe the three
18 Card at al. (1999) write down the following relationship between the relative e±ciency term and
their instrument: (¾ ¡ 1)¢ln(cjt) = ® + ¯ Dj + uj where Dj is either the initial wage level or the
proportion of individuals using computer at work at the end of the period.
12equations for wage, employment and labor supply respectively.19 Careful inspection of
Table 1 suggests that when ½ = 1, the last two columns become identical. In other
words, if wages are °exible and the labor market clears, the changes in employment
equal the changes in labor supply, as the two are the same. There is no unemployment,
the population consists only of employed and inactive. In this case, the model reduces
from three to two equations, the wage equation and the employment equation. It can be
shown that all the key parameters (¾, ", ¯ f, ¯ m, ° f, ° m) are identi¯ed from these
two equations. On the other hand, when ½ < 1, the last two columns di®er. In
other words, if wages are not perfectly °exible, labor supply consists of employment
and unemployment, and the third equation is needed, so that all three labor force states
(employment, unemployment and inactivity) can be determined in the model. In this
case, identi¯cation of all the key parameters stated above, as well as the wage °exibility
parameter ½, requires the third equation to be estimated as well.20
3.4 Proposed Tests of (Extended) Trade-o® Hypothesis
The above presented framework allows us to test the trade-o® theory as well as its
extended version in several ways: The least restrictive tests are based on the estimated
reduced-form coe±cients from the system of equations 12, 13 and 14.21 In general, and
regardless of the particular theoretical model at hand, the trade-o® theory suggests that
(adverse) demand shocks work predominately through prices (wages) in the economies
where wages are °exible, and through quantities (employment) in economies where wages
are rigid. We should therefore expect the demand shocks to have a greater impact on
wages than on employment in the ¯rst case, and a greater impact on employment than
on wages in the second. If the trade-o® hypothesis holds for the three countries over the
1990s, the coe±cient of the demand shifter in the wage equation should be greater, both
in terms of magnitude and signi¯cance, than in the employment equation in countries
with °exible wages, such as the US and possibly the UK, while the opposite should be
true for France.22 If the three countries are similar in other respects (if other structural
coe±cients in the model have similar magnitudes), these di®erences should be con¯rmed
in the cross-country comparison as well. Namely, the trade-o® hypothesis would then
imply that the wage coe±cient of the demand shifter in the US and possibly also in the
UK is greater in signi¯cance and magnitude than that in France, while the opposite holds
for the coe±cient of the demand shifter in the employment equation. Within-country
and cross-country comparisons of the demand shifter coe±cients in the two equations
therefore constitute the ¯rst set of tests of the trade-o® hypothesis in this analysis.
An additional test, which is still based on the reduced-form parameters but has more
structural justi¯cation, is based on the property of the theoretical model as discussed at
the end of the previous section, namely the identity of the employment and labor supply
19See Section D of the Appendix for the mapping between the structural and the reduced-form group-
speci¯c and year-speci¯c e®ects, and the structural and the reduced-form error terms.
20Identi¯cation of the full model is shown in Section D.2 in the Appendix.
21 The least \restrictive" in the sense that they do not necessarily impose any particular theoretical
model, including the one presented here, to interpret the results.
22This conjecture is consistent with the structural interpretation of the coe±cients, as a function of
structural parameters as described in Table 1, when ½ = 1 and when ½ <
¾+"
¾+1 .
13coe±cients when ½ = 1. It follows that the extent of wage °exibility in a given economy
may be also assessed by comparing the coe±cients from the two equations. To bring
further evidence on trade-o® hypothesis and its extended version, we therefore next test
the hypothesis that the set (or subset) of the key coe±cients of the employment and
labor supply equations are equal. We would expect the results to reveal greater wage
°exibility (i.e. smaller rejection probability) in the US and possibly in the UK than in
France.
The ¯nal test is based on the structural estimation of the model and consists in
the direct comparison of the magnitude of ½, the parameter describing wage °exibility.
Again, a value of ½ which is higher (closer to 1) in the US or possibly in the UK when
compared to France, would support the relevance of the trade-o® hypothesis.
The extended trade-o® hypothesis can be also tested using both the reduced-form,
as well as the structural parameters. For this hypothesis to hold, it is necessary to show
that ¯rst, as before, the demand shocks a®ect relative wages in the US and possibly the
UK more than in France, and that the labor force participation in the three countries is
wage elastic. As for the reduced-form parameters, the coe±cients of the demand shifter
in the wage equation should be again signi¯cant and bigger in countries where wages are
°exible, and the e®ect of the demand shifter on employment and labor supply should be
identical there. In countries where wages are rigid, labor supply should be less sensitive
to the demand shifter than employment. In terms of the structural parameters, the
wage elasticity of labor supply " is the parameter to look at. For the extended trade-o®
hypothesis to hold, it needs to be positive and signi¯cant, suggesting that the labor force
participation is indeed sensitive to the changes in wages, in particular in countries where
wages are °exile, such as the US or also the UK.
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Reduced-Form Estimation
The theoretical model presented in the previous section and described in the reduced
form by the system of the three equations 12, 13 and 14, is estimated using the group-
level data constructed from the individual-level datasets from the series of national labor
force surveys conducted in the three countries over the 1990s. The skill-groups are based
on gender, age and education. The estimation is carried out for each country separately.
To take into account the group-speci¯c heterogeneity in preferences, and the group-
speci¯c institutional component a®ecting the actual wage, the model is estimated with
the group ¯xed e®ects present in each of the three equations. Year ¯xed e®ects are
also included in all three equations, so as to capture the aggregate development of the
economy over time (changes in yt) and the changes in institutions that a®ect all the





jt¯ i + "i
jt (16)
where j and t indicates group and time respectively, i is an indicator for one of the
three equations in the system, y-s are the three dependent variables, x-s are the supply
14and demand shifters, D-s are group and year ¯xed e®ects, and ¯-s are the reduced-
form coe±cients. With the group and the year ¯xed e®ects, the present analysis focuses
on the within group and year variation in the wage and labor-force-status di®erentials
rather than on their levels. It explores to what extent the relative deviations of the left-
hand-side variables from their time and group averages can be explained by the relative
deviations of the exogenous factors on the right-hand side.
The two-way ¯xed e®ect model is estimated in terms of these deviations by linear
least squares as follows
y¤i
jt = x¤i
jt¯ i + "¤i
jt (17)
where y¤i
jt = y i
jt ¡ ¹ y i
j ¡ ¹ y i
t + ¹ ¹ yi, with ¹ y i
j and ¹ y i
t being the time and group averages




The three equations form a seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) system
with the same right-hand-side variables, so that the joint and equation-by-equation
estimations give identical results. However, joint estimation is necessary for obtaining
the appropriate covariance matrix for the computation of the standard errors. This is
done in the following way. The system of the three equations, expressed in deviations as
suggested above, is estimated jointly, with the data for the three equations stacked one
above each other, allowing the coe±cients to di®er across the equations. Standard errors
are based on the panel-robust sandwich-type covariance matrix (similar to Huber-White
estimator for the cross-section) that allows for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, as
well as the cross-equation correlation of unknown forms, but assumes independence of
the error terms across the groups (i.e. over j). The robust covariance matrix is calculated
as follows








































The group-level variables are constructed from the individual-level data as means
or proportions. This method builds into the model a particular type of group-wise
heteroskedasticity, as the variance of the within-group-averaged individual error term
varies with the sample size. In addition, the binary nature of the employment and labor
force participation indicators further implies a speci¯c form of the heteroskedasticity
present in the log-linear models of the proportion data. The above de¯ned estimator of
the covariance matrix controls for the two speci¯c types of heteroskedasticity as well.
There are two approaches employed in the way the group-speci¯c wage is constructed.
First, we use the median of the logarithm of the real hourly wages observed in each
group. Second, we use the median of the logarithm of the real hourly wages predicted
for individuals with missing wage information, by the standard two-equation model of
Heckman.23 The details of the speci¯cation of the selection and the wage equations in
23 We cannot use the method of imputing the missing wages with the minimum wage or assuming
15the Heckman model are given in Section E.1 in the Appendix. The second procedure is
preferred, as it corrects the potential selection bias present in the previously mentioned
group-speci¯c wage estimates. We also alternate median wages with mean wages.
4.2 Choice of the Demand Shifter
The demand shifter that serves as an instrument for the unobserved relative e±ciency
measure is the skill-group's share in the total value added produced in the whole economy
of the given country in the previous year. The information about each individual's
industry is employed to map the industry-speci¯c information to the skill-group data.
The demand shifter is constructed in the following way





where k is the industry identi¯er, pkjt =
Nkjt
Nkt is the proportion of individuals from
group j among the total number of individuals in industry k in year t, and SV Akt is
the percentage share of industry k in the total value added in the economy in year t.
The information about the value added shares by industry comes from the OECD STAN
database. There are 23 to 25 industry groups per country.24 The changes in the share of
the total value added are likely to be correlated with the changes in the relative e±ciency
of the skill-group, and in general with the labor demand for the individuals from that
group.
4.3 Endogeneity Concerns: Marital Status and Children
There is a labor economic literature which suggests that marital status as well as fertility
decisions may be endogenous to the labor supply decision and should be therefore
instrumented in the estimation of the labor supply equation. As we work with the group-
level data, the proportion of married individuals and those with pre-school age children
represent a proxy for the inclinations of the di®erent groups to marry or have children in
a particular age rather than the actual micro-level evidence about them, and shouldn't
therefore su®er from the endogeneity bias at the individual level. A relevant objection
here, however, is that the decisions about the family structure may be endogenous to
the situation in the labor market. Namely, there are papers that focus on Spain (see
Mira and Ahn (2001)) and other South European countries, showing that the date of
marriage as well as the date of the ¯rst-child birth are postponed due to the unfavorable
conditions in the market for jobs. Individuals cannot a®ord to start a family if they have
only a temporary job or are no job at all, and therefore postpone it till they become
permanently employed. In this sense, it may not be the change in the preferences to
that they are below the overall median, as done in Card et al. (1999) and elsewhere, since in the
present analysis wages are sometimes missing not only for non-workers, but also for self-employed and
those employed who did not report their wage. Setting their wage to minimum wage would seriously
underestimate the means, and even the medians, in cases where more than 50 % of the wages in the
skill-group are missing (although these are quite rare).
24 See Section A of the Appendix for details.
16marry and have children at a later stage of life that exogenously drive the changes in
the labor supply, but the postponement in the timing of marriage and children itself is
an outcome of high unemployment rate and other unfavorable characteristics of the job
market. Although none of the research we know of focuses on any of the three countries,
and the story holds in particular for the new entrants who are, given the age restriction,
most likely not part of the analysis here,25 we keep this concern in mind and re-estimate
the model without these two supply shifters. All the results go through even when the
two variables are omitted and none of our conclusions qualitatively changes. The only
exception is the reduced from estimation of the wage equation for the UK. This, however,
seems to be a consequence of the fact that the two factors also serve as a proxy for a
more detailed age categorization than captured by the group ¯xed e®ects in the UK. The
sensitivity results and the discussion of this one exception can be found in the Appendix
in section C.1.
4.4 Structural Estimation
We have described above the empirical strategy to estimate the reduced-form parameters
of our model, as described by equations 12, 13 and 14. We next use the non-linear least
squares to recover the key structural parameters.26 The NLS estimator is applied to
the same three-equation system with equation-speci¯c two-way ¯xed e®ects, expressed
in deviations and stacked together as described in equation 17. The only di®erence is
that we now substitute the key reduced-form coe±cients27 with the respective functions
of the structural parameters, as presented in Table 1.
4.5 Data Construction
The three national labor force surveys used to construct the group-level panel data
are Enqu^ ete Emploi (1990-2002) for France, Labor Force Survey (1993-2002) for the
UK, and the March CPS (1990-2002) for the US. The details are given in Section
A in the Appendix. The sample selected for the empirical analysis consist of non-
institutionalized individuals between the ages of 25 and 54. Individuals under 25 and
over 54 years of age are not included in the analysis, as there are too many institutional
issues (such as length of education and early retirement legislature) that di®er across the
three countries and make them not directly comparable. Although these groups have an
important share in the total labor market, we choose to avoid the potential impact of
these institutional di®erences on the present analysis and focus exclusively on prime age
25 We exclude individuals below the age of 25.
26 Minimum distance method with equal and optimal weighting (i.e. the method of moments and
the generalized method of moments) were used to recover the structural parameters from the estimated
reduced-form coe±cients as a second step of the analysis in the previous version of this paper. However,
the NLS estimation proved out to give more convincing (although in many respects similar) results. In
addition, the direct NLS estimation is by de¯nition more e±cient than the two step method used before.
I am grateful to Richard Spady for this suggestion.
27Only the coe±cients of the demand and supply shifters get estimated in the two-way ¯xed-e®ect
model with variables expressed in deviations.
17individuals.28 Students, conscripts and members of the Armed Forces are also excluded.
The employment and the labor force participation rates are de¯ned in the standard way:
Employed individuals include the employed and the self-employed, as well as the unpaid
family workers, and labor force participants are individuals who are either employed or
unemployed (according to the ILO de¯nition of unemployment). The wage information
uses the hourly wage as the key measure. The wages are reported gross of taxes in the
US and the UK, but net of employees' payroll taxes in France. The present analysis uses
the same argument for the validity of the cross-country di®erences as in Card, Kramarz,
and Lemieux (1999, p. 857): the employees' payroll taxes in France are set at a ¯xed
rate, and therefore should not a®ect the relative between-group wages which are the main
focus of the analysis. For a more detailed discussion of this fact and the gross versus net
wages di®erences in France, see Section A in the Appendix.
There are 72 skill-groups (and 60 for the UK) de¯ned in each dataset. The skill-
groups are based on gender, ¯ve age ranges (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54)
and six education categories in France and the US, and ¯ve education categories in the
UK. Their classi¯cation is chosen so as to keep a reasonable size of all the skill-groups
over all the years. The group sample size is never below 150 individuals.
The group ¯xed-e®ects used in the estimation are de¯ned in such a way, that each
group is allowed to have its own ¯xed time-invariant component for each of the three left
hand side variables. There are 72 ¯xed e®ects for the 72 skill-groups in France and the
US respectively in the model. To avoid over-parametrization when using the data from
the UK, which has only 5 education categories and a shorter time span, we de¯ne the
group ¯xed e®ects on a broader age categories than the ones the data are strati¯ed by.
Namely, the six categories are lumped together into three age ranges (25-34, 35-44 and
45-54) for the construction of the ¯xed e®ects for the UK. There are therefore only 30
¯xed e®ects for the 60 skill-groups in the estimation for the UK.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
The ¯rst set of tests of the trade-o® hypothesis are based on the results from the
estimation of the reduced-form system of equations 12, 13, and 14. They focus on
sensitivity of wages and employment rates to exogenous changes in the demand in the
three countries. Tables 2 and 3 show the estimated coe±cients of the demand shifter in
wage (W), employment (E), and labor supply (LS) equations.29 The two sets of results
di®er only in the construction of the hourly wage variable: while in the ¯rst table, wage
for skill-group j is constructed as median of the observed and the predicted wages of
individuals from that group, in the second table, it is constructed as their mean. The
coe±cients in the employment and labor supply equations are therefore identical across
28 Prime age individuals who are out of school correspond to the \population" in the theoretical model
presented in Section 3.
29 The full set of coe±cients from the reduced-form estimation for these and other speci¯cations is
available in Section C in the Appendix.
18the two speci¯cations. In what follows, we refer to the results from Table 2. However,
the two sets of estimates do not qualitatively di®er.
The trade-o® hypothesis suggests that wages should be more sensitive to exogenous
changes in the demand in the US and possibly in the UK, countries where wages are
°exible, than in France. The opposite should be true for the employment rate. The
results show that, for France and the US, this is indeed the case: In France, the coe±cient
of the demand shifter in the wage equation (0.034) is only weakly signi¯cant and half
the size of that in the employment equation (0.077), which is highly signi¯cant. The
opposite is true for the US: the coe±cient in the wage equation is highly signi¯cant and
about four times bigger (0.086) than that in the employment equation (0.018), which is
not signi¯cant. Table 4, which shows the F-statistics of the test of the hypothesis that
the coe±cients in the wage and employment equations are equal, con¯rms that these
within-country di®erences between the two coe±cients are signi¯cant.30 As for the UK,
the results seem contrary to what was expected: Unlike the US, and similar to France,
the demand shifter coe±cient in the wage equation is only weakly signi¯cant and only one
third in the magnitude (0.038) than that of the employment equation (0.118), which is
again highly signi¯cant. Again, the di®erence between the two coe±cients is signi¯cant.
However - going back to the theoretical model - a closer inspection of the two coe±cients
in terms of the functions of structural parameters they represent, as given in Table 1,
suggests that the observed di®erence between the two coe±cients may also occur due to
other factors than the wage rigidity parameter ½, namely the size of ¾, and in particular
".31 As we will see later, this is indeed the case for the UK.
A similar test is based on the comparison of the wage and employment equation
coe±cients of the demand shifter across countries, assuming that the three countries are
similar in all relevant respects other than wage °exibility. The results are consistent
with the ¯ndings from the within-country comparison: The wage-equation coe±cient
in the US is more signi¯cant and twice as large in magnitude than the corresponding
coe±cients in the other two countries. The opposite is true for the coe±cient in the
employment equation, which is not signi¯cant for the US, and much smaller than that
for France, which in turn is smaller than the one for the UK. Table 5 shows the t-statistics
of the test of the hypothesis that the corresponding coe±cients in the same equation are
equal for each of the two countries. As the estimation is done separately by country,
independence of the coe±cients across countries is assumed. The results suggest that
the di®erences in all the analyzed coe±cients are signi¯cant (or close to) at 10 % or lower
signi¯cance level, when France (and also the UK) is compared to the US. The coe±cients
for France and the UK, however, are not statistically di®erent. The conclusion of the
¯rst two tests is that in the US, the demand shocks a®ect wages more than employment
while the opposite is true for France, but also for the UK. The e®ect of the demand
shocks on wages is also twice as big in the US than in the other two countries, while the
e®ect on employment is much greater in the other two countries than in the US. The
results are consistent with the expectations about France and the US, given the known
features of the wage setting mechanisms in the two countries. The trade-o® hypothesis
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19is con¯rmed by both within-country and cross-country comparisons, when focusing on
France versus the US. The UK, however, seems to be, based on the outcomes of these
two tests, more like France than the US, which is against the trade-o® hypothesis and
our prior expectations.
Table 2: Demand Shifter Coe±cient I
W E LS
FR 0.034y (0.018) 0.077¤¤ (0.019) 0.065¤¤ (0.016)
US 0.086¤¤ (0.019) 0.018 (0.020) 0.036y (0.021)
UK 0.038y (0.019) 0.118¤¤ (0.027) 0.101¤¤ (0.026)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Wage constructed as the median of the observed and predicted wages.
Table 3: Demand Shifter Coe±cient II
W E LS
FR 0.033¤ (0.016) 0.077¤¤ (0.019) 0.065¤¤ (0.016)
US 0.066¤¤ (0.014) 0.018 (0.020) 0.036y (0.021)
UK 0.007 (0.021) 0.118¤¤ (0.027) 0.101¤¤ (0.026)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Wage constructed as the mean of the observed and predicted wages.
Table 4: Comparison Across Equations (Within Country)
¼:
c FR US UK
I II I II I II
W vs E 3.46y 4.53¤ 6.12¤ 3.65y 7.30¤ 12.78¤¤
W vs LS 1.82 2.44 3.87y 1.54 4.26¤ 8.35¤¤
E vs LS 4.00¤ 4.00¤ 2.68 2.68 2.61 2.61
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%





The second test of the trade-o® hypothesis is still based on the reduced-form coe±-
cient estimates but uses a structural prediction of the theoretical model. Namely, if the
actual wage changes with the equilibrium wage one to one (i.e. if ½ = 1), the coe±cients
in the employment and labor supply equations should be equal. In other words, if
wages are absolutely °exible, employment and labor supply change by the same amount
20in response to the exogenous shocks, as they become identical in the model. Table 6
shows the F-statistic of the test of the hypothesis that the (sub)sets of coe±cients of the
employment and labor supply equations are equal for a given country.32 This hypothesis
is always rejected for France, whether a subset or a full set of the coe±cients of the two
equations are compared. However, it cannot be rejected for neither the US nor the UK
when we compare the coe±cients of the demand shifter in the two equations. In addition,
the same conclusion holds for the UK when we focus on both the demand shifter and
the coe±cient of the share of the skill-group in population. Equality is rejected for the
US and for the UK in other instances, when we include the coe±cients of other supply
shifters, such as marital status and presence of pre-school age children. However, the
values of the F-statistics are always smaller than the ones for France. On the basis of this
test we conclude that: there is wage rigidity (½ < 1) in France which makes exogenous
shocks a®ect employment and labor supply in di®erent ways; full wage °exibility cannot
be rejected on the basis of the comparison of the demand shifter coe±cients for the
US; full wage °exibility can be rejected in the UK only when all the coe±cients of the
two equations are compared. As for the comparison of France and the US, the test
just con¯rms the previous ¯ndings. However, it also provides evidence for the trade-o®
hypothesis when France is compared to the UK. Although, this is consistent with the
trade-o® hypothesis and with prior expectations about the wage °exibility in the UK, it
is contrary to our previous ¯ndings. As will be shown, structural estimation will help
us reconcile and interpret the seemingly controversial conclusions concerning the case of
the UK. We turn to the structural results next.
Table 5: Cross-country Comparisons of the Demand Shifter Coe±cient
W E LS
I II I II I II
FR vs US -1.99¤ -1.55 2.14¤ 2.14¤ 1.10 1.10
FR vs UK -0.15 0.98 -1.24 -1.24 -1.18 -1.18
US vs UK 1.79y 2.34¤¤ -2.98¤¤ -2.98¤¤ -1.94y -1.94y
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%




c for countries A and B, where t =





Before computing the structural parameters, we can ¯rst check the empirical validity of
the model by exploring the signs of the reduced-form coe±cients from the perspective of
their corresponding structural content, as described in Table 1. The reduced-form results
(see Section C in the Appendix for the full estimation results for the two speci¯cations
described above) seem to be more or less consistent with the predictions of the theoretical
32 The test compares (sub)sets of the coe±cients of the two-way ¯xed e®ect model estimated in
deviations. The test is F(k;71) for France and the US, and F(k;29) for the UK with k = 1;2;6 respectively.









p 23.78¤¤ 6.67¤¤ 1.75
All coe±cients 11.32¤¤ 2.72¤ 8.42¤¤
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
model. As ¾, " and ½ are all assumed greater than zero and the term
¾ ½
¾+" is likely
to be smaller than one,33 the coe±cient of the logarithm of the group's share in the
population is expected to be negative in all three equations, and this is the case for all
three countries.34 If, in addition, ¾ is assumed to be greater than one (as has to be the
case in order to assure a positive e®ect of the relative e±ciency parameters on the labor
demand), the coe±cients of the demand shifters should be all positive, which again is
true for all countries and equations under both speci¯cations.
Projecting the structural parameters to the coe±cients of other supply shifters sug-
gests that their signs in the employment and labor force participation equation should
correspond to the sign of their structural counterparts, while in the wage equation the
reduced-form and the structural coe±cients have an opposite sign. The structural sign of
the e®ect of presence of pre-school children in the household on the labor force participa-
tion of women is negative, as one would empirically expect, for all three countries.35 The
implied structural e®ect of children on the labor force participation of men has mixed
signs and it is signi¯cant only in the wage and employment equations in the US, and
in the employment equations in France, where it implies a positive e®ect. The results
for the e®ects of the marital status are even less clear. Although, consistently with the
empirical literature, the coe±cients in the employment and labor supply equations in all
three countries imply that being married has a negative or insigni¯cant e®ect on female
labor supply, and a positive or insigni¯cant e®ect on male labor supply, the coe±cients in
the wage equations seem to contradict the story in several cases. It is however possible,
that the marital-status variables in the wage equation may be capturing other factors
such as di®erent distribution of the individual cohorts within the relatively broad age
categories, and be therefore correlated with age as well. As described later in this section,
structural estimates o®er a more consistent picture of the e®ects of the two exogenous
supply shifters.
The ¯nal test of the trade-o® hypothesis is based on the cross-country comparison
of the values of the structural parameters of the model. The structural coe±cients were
33 The reason being that " is positive and ½ should not exceed one.
34The only exception is the coe±cient in the employment equation in the second speci¯cation for
France, which is positive but not signi¯cant.
35 The only exception is in the wage equation for the US in the speci¯cation that uses median rather
than mean for the construction of wage (Table C.1): the coe±cient has a positive sign, but it is only
weakly signi¯cant. It has the correct sign but is not signi¯cant in the other speci¯cation. Also, although
correctly signed, the coe±cient is not signi¯cant in the wage and employment equations in France.
22estimated by non-linear least squares applied to the system of the three equations 12,
13, and 14, once the reduced-form coe±cients where substituted by the corresponding
functions of their structural counterparts, as de¯ned in Table 1. The results for the two
speci¯cations (with wages constructed as medians and means respectively) are presented
in Tables 7 and 8.
The non-linear structure of the model with linear relationships between di®erent
sets of the reduced-form coe±cients both within and across equations required that
one of the parameters be constrained, to achieve convergence of the model. Although,
theoretically, all structural parameters are identi¯ed, the way in which ¸ and ¾ appear
in the demand shifter coe±cient together for all three equations make the estimation of
their values unstable. For this reason, we choose ¸, the parameter of the relationship
between the unobserved relative productivity coe±cients and the demand shifter we use,
as the coe±cient which is of the least interest to the present analysis, to be constrained
to one in the estimation. This constraint has a straightforward interpretation and
corresponds to the following assumption: if ¸ = 1, the relationship between the logarithm
of unobserved productivity and the logarithm of the share in the value added in the
previous year becomes ln(cjt) = ¸0t+ln(~ cjt)+º c
jt. This restricts the relationship between
the two variables to be linear, although changing in time, as captured by exp(¸0t). The
interpretation of this restriction is the following: one percentage change in the group j's
productivity corresponds to one percentage change in the group j's share in the value
added produced in the economy in the previous year.
Table 7: Structural Results - Full I
FR US UK
½ 0.796¤¤ (0.011) 0.835¤¤ (0.016) 0.842¤¤ (0.014)
¾ 1.893¤¤ (0.033) 1.889¤¤ (0.066) 2.249¤¤ (0.086)
" 0.145¤ (0.060) 0.145¤ (0.065) 0.282¤¤ (0.089)
¯f 0.017 (0.130) 0.114 (0.147) -0.024 (0.079)
¯m 0.479¤¤ (0.098) 0.147y (0.088) -0.101¤ (0.040)
°f -0.207¤ (0.090) -0.460¤¤ (0.168) -0.319¤¤ (0.051)
°m -0.008 (0.067) 0.414¤¤ (0.155) 0.063¤ (0.025)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Wage constructed as the median of the observed and predicted wages.
Structural results bring further evidence in favor of the trade-o® hypothesis, although
more so for the ¯rst speci¯cation, when wages are constructed as group medians. The
last test consists in comparing the estimates of the wage rigidity parameter ½ from
our structural model across the three countries. First, it is clear from the size of the
coe±cients and their standard errors, that the hypothesis that ½ = 1 can be rejected
for all three countries, meaning that wages are not perfectly °exible in any of them.
The estimates are 0.796 for France for both speci¯cations, 0.835 and 0.82 (median and
mean wage speci¯cations respectively) for the US, and 0.842 and 0.826 for the UK.
23Table 8: Structural Results - Full II
FR US UK
½ 0.796¤¤ (0.010) 0.820¤¤ (0.014) 0.826¤¤ (0.013)
¾ 1.866¤¤ (0.033) 1.896¤¤ (0.047) 2.208¤¤ (0.074)
" 0.127¤ (0.058) 0.140¤ (0.066) 0.280¤¤ (0.091)
¯f 0.011 (0.136) 0.046 (0.147) -0.026 (0.090)
¯m 0.489¤¤ (0.099) 0.227¤ (0.090) -0.115¤ (0.043)
°f -0.205¤ (0.091) -0.421¤ (0.170) -0.344¤¤ (0.051)
°m -0.022 (0.067) 0.331¤ (0.151) 0.065¤ (0.026)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Wage constructed as the mean of the observed and predicted wages.
Although the di®erences between France and the other two countries are not huge, they
are signi¯cant, in particular when we focus on the ¯rst speci¯cation. The asymptotic t-
statistics for the di®erence between France and the US are 2.01 and 1.39 (the di®erences
are signi¯cant at 5 % and 20 % signi¯cance level respectively). For the UK, the test
statistics of the di®erences are 2.58 and 1.53 (the di®erences are signi¯cant at 1 % and
15 % signi¯cance level respectively). The di®erences between the coe±cients for the UK
and the US are not signi¯cant. The trade-o® hypothesis for France versus the US and
the UK is therefore con¯rmed in the sense that wage rigidity as modeled here a®ects
the relative labor market outcomes for di®erent skill-groups more in France than in the
other two countries. Comparing the estimates of other parameters, namely ¾ and ",
helps us understand why the ¯rst test of the trade-o® hypothesis, based solely on the
comparison of the demand shock sensitivity in the wage and employment equations, can
be misleading and imply an erroneous conclusion of high wage rigidity in the UK. The
structural results show, that both ¾ and " are signi¯cantly higher in the UK (2.25 and
0.28 respectively in the ¯rst speci¯cation) than in the two other countries (around 1.9
and 1.45 for both France and the US), resulting in the demand shock coe±cient in the
employment equation being higher than that in the wage equation. It is therefore the
high labor demand and labor supply wage elasticity (and not high wage rigidity, as the
¯rst test would wrongly conclude) which makes the employment be more sensitive to
the demand shocks than wages in the UK.36 This fact, however, is only revealed in the
structural estimation.
As for the other structural coe±cients of the labor supply, the results con¯rm that
in all three countries, presence of pre-school age children has a negative e®ect on female
labor supply. The e®ect is the highest in the US and the lowest in France, pointing at
the cross-country di®erences either in preferences or in the cost of child care. In accord
36 This is consistent with the author's previous ¯ndings (see Bi· c¶ akov¶ a(2005)). The values of " estimated
here are not directly comparable to the usual ¯ndings of the wage elasticity of labor supply, as this is
an "averaged" estimate (across gender, age and education), common to all the skill-groups, of the wage
elasticity of labor force participation (rather than labor supply of hours of work).
24with this ranking, pre-school age children have positive e®ect on male labor supply in
the US and the UK but none in France. Somewhat surprisingly, being married doesn't
seem to a®ect female labor supply but it increases the labor supply of men in France and
the US but decreases it in the UK.37
The extended trade-o® hypothesis (the original trade-o® hypothesis extended to what
happens to labor supply and inactivity) ¯nds also supporting evidence: As the trade-o®
hypothesis is part of the story, the same tests apply as above. In the US, wages are more
sensitive to the demand shocks than in France. Demand shifter a®ects employment and
labor supply in a statistically undistinguishable way in the US and the UK, while it has
greater impact on employment than on labor supply in France. We can therefore conclude
that negative demand shock works through wages and consequently increases inactivity
in the US, while it primarily a®ects employment in France. To reconcile the insensitivity
of wages to the demand shocks in the UK with its identical e®ect on employment and
labor supply, we need again the structural results. Besides con¯rming the ranking of the
three countries as regards their degree of wage rigidity in terms of the estimate of ½ as
discussed above, the structural results also show that " is positive and signi¯cant in all
three countries. The ¯ndings therefore con¯rm that labor force participation is indeed
wage elastic, which is a necessary condition for the extended version of the trade-o®
hypothesis to hold. The fact that " is almost twice as big in the UK than in the other
two countries explains the controversial reduced-form ¯ndings for the UK. High wage
elasticity there leads to a °atter labor supply curve that in turn implies low sensitivity of
wages to the demand shocks, which may be incorrectly interpreted as wage rigidity. We
therefore conclude that the extended trade-o® hypothesis also adds to the explanation of
the observed patterns of relative wages and labor force status proportions across di®erent
skill-groups in the three countries. The deterioration in relative wages in countries with
°exible wages such as the US and the UK seemed to have contributed to the increase in
inactivity rates of the low-skilled groups a®ected by the adverse demand shocks.
Overall, the structural results seem to con¯rm that wages in France are less °exible
than wages in the US and the UK, and that the wage rigidity a®ected the development
of wages and labor force status proportions in the French economy during the analyzed
period. Based on the outcomes of the tests presented in this section, we conclude that
the trade-o® hypothesis and its extended version has signi¯cant explanatory power when
the labor market outcomes for relative skill-groups are compared between France and
the US, as well as when France is compared to the UK.
5.3 Counterfactual Simulations
We next use our ¯ndings to interpret the actual developments in the relative wages and
labor force status proportions observed in the three countries during the analyzed period.
If the changes in the demand structure continued to favor the high skilled against the low
skilled, given our ¯ndings about wage °exibility and its e®ects, other things being equal,
we would expect the following trends: In countries with °exible wages, such as the US
and the UK, the changes in the demand would increase primarily relative wages between
37 As mentioned above, this may be caused by the fact that the group speci¯c marital status variable
also plays a proxy for other factors, such as cohort e®ects within the age groups.
25the high skilled and the low skilled, while keeping their relative employment rates less
a®ected. According to the extended trade-o® hypothesis, we should also expect that
these changes in the wage structure would lead to an increase in the inactivity rates of
the low skilled relative to the high skilled. In countries where wages are rigid, such as
France, the changes in the demand should a®ect primarily relative employment rates,
while keeping the relative wages and inactivity rates unchanged. However, given our
¯ndings about the high wage elasticity of both labor supply and labor demand in the
UK, we may expect smaller e®ect on relative wages and bigger e®ect on employment
there as well.
Figures B.1 through B.6 present the changes in the labor force status and earnings for
the six (¯ve in the UK) educational categories. Note that the ¯gures di®er in scale, so as
to capture best the between-group di®erences and their changes over time in each country
and gender group. Any cross-country comparisons of levels or changes require looking
at the actual magnitudes. Figures B.1 through B.4 that show the employment and
inactivity rates highlight the di®erence between the least educated, i.e. education group
1 and 2 in the US (high-school dropouts: below 9th grade, and between 9th and 12th),
group 1 in the UK (less than O-levels), and group 1 in France (no diploma or CEP), and
the rest of the population: the least skilled have substantially lower employment rates
and higher inactivity rates than everybody else in all three countries. Their employment
rate is (at least in the US and France) also more sensitive to the business cycle than the
employment rate of the other groups.
The changes in the levels of the observed employment rates were mostly driven by
the aggregate developments in the three countries over the 1990s. While the UK and the
US were in an expansionary phase of the business cycle over the 1990s (starting in 1992
in the US and 1993 in the UK), for France most of the period was recessionary, with the
economic recovery starting only in 1998. Accordingly, employment rates in the US and
the UK were rising in all education categories, while in France they were falling in most
years.
In France, the relative employment rates of the most educated relative to the least
educated increased from 1.13 to 1.9 for men, while it slightly decreased for women (from
1.61 to 1.59). Relative inactivity fell from 0.22 to 0.14 for men and from 0.32 to 0.23 for
women. In the US, the relative employment rates decreased from 1.34 to 1.29 for men
and from 2.23 to 1.95 for women. Relative inactivity rates have increased from 0.11 to
0.19 for men and from 0.20 to 0.26 for women. In the UK, male relative employment
rates fell from 1.27 to 1.24, while female relative employment rates increased from 1.41
to 1.54. The relative inactivity rates among men fell from 0.17 to 0.15 and that of women
from 0.35 to 0.24.
In the US, the real wages fanned out substantially over the entire period, with the
ratio of the mean hourly wage of the highest education group to that of the lowest
increasing from 2.55 to 3.5 for men and from 2.7 to 3.05 for women. It was mostly the
rapid increase in the wages of the high educated that caused this rise in the between
group inequality, as the wages of the least skilled stagnated (or only slightly increased
for women). The between-group wage di®erences declined in the other two countries:
the highest-lowest education group ratio decreased from 2.16 to 2.15 for men and from
2.4 to 2.21 for women in the UK, and from 2.14 to 1.93 for men and 2.34 to 2.02 for
26women in France.38 The beginning of the steeper growth in the wages of the least skilled
in the UK coincides with the introduction of the minimum wage in April 1999 and its
subsequent increases. The automatically adjusted minimum wage in France (indexed to
wage in°ation) and the impact of collective bargaining is likely to account for the wage
increases among the low skilled in this country.39
To summarize: While the between-group variation in wages has increased in the US,
the employment rates of the educational groups have come closer together40 and the male
inactivity rates have continued to fan out. In the UK, the between-group di®erences in
wages and employment have stayed more or less the same, while in France it was the
wages that got closer together and the employment rates that diverged. In both countries,
inactivity has fanned out for both men and women.41
The above described developments in the relative wages and labor force status pro-
portions are therefore more or less consistent with what the ¯ndings of our empirical
analysis would suggest to happen in consequence of the continuing skill-biased change
in the demand structure.42 However, the on-going changes in the demand has been also
accompanied by an opposite supply side trend, namely the shifts in the structure of the
population. With increasing investment in education and rising life expectancy, popula-
tions are becoming more educated and the average age increases, so that the proportion
of the low skilled (de¯ned by education and age) in the population is decreasing relative
to the high skilled. Changes in the demand have been therefore counteracted by changes
in the supply, and both have to be taken into account when explaining the observed
labor market outcomes across the di®erent skill-groups.
We next use the reduced-form results from our empirical analysis to construct coun-
terfactual series holding the respective supply or the demand shifters constant in order
to disentangle the e®ect of the changes in the demand and population structures on
the observed developments. A comparison of the actual and the simulated series reveals
what factors stood behind the development in earnings and labor force status in di®erent
skill-groups in the three countries, and which of the two factors have dominated. These
38 The ratios might be slightly higher and the decrease smaller if the information on gross wages was
available. Although the pay-roll taxes in France are a ¯xed proportion, there are top ceilings up to which
the percentage applies. There is also a minimum wage level below which the tax does not apply. However,
it is the case that majority of the population is in between the two limits. Unfortunately, all the wage
inequality statistics available for France (such as the OECD measures) that I could ¯nd to compare my
estimates against, were based on wages net of the payroll taxes.
39 However, again, part of the increase may be also due to the reduction in the relative e®ective payroll
taxes paid by the high educated versus the low educated.
40 This might be partially due to an economy's boom which typically has higher impact on the
employment of the low skilled as compared with the high skilled.
41 The employment rate, the inactivity rate and the earnings for the six age groups (not presented in
the paper) show very similar patterns across all three countries: for women, employment has increased
and inactivity decreased in all age groups but most among the old; both the employment rates and the
inactivity rates among di®erent age groups of women have therefore converged together over the period.
The employment rate among men for all age groups has increased in the UK, while it has decreased
and followed the business cycle in France and the US. The employment of the 50-54 age old men has
decreased most, while their inactivity has risen most sharply in all three countries. The wage rates have
increased at a similar pace across all age groups in all three countries both for men and women, but at
a higher rate for the latter.
42 Exception are the fanning out inactivity rates for France, which will be discussed later in the text.
27simulations are presented in Figures B.7 to B.15 in the Appendix.43 First, in-sample
prediction was performed where the estimated reduced-form model is used to predict the
earnings and labor force status of the respective skill-groups. Second, two counterfactual
series were generated to separate the e®ect of exogenous changes in the supply and the
demand respectively. In this simulation exercise, earnings and labor force status of each
skill-group are predicted using the estimated reduced-form coe±cients, while holding the
demand or supply shifter constant at its value at the beginning of the period. The two
simulated series thus represent the counterfactual evidence suggested by the model of
how earnings and labor force status of the respective groups would have evolved had
there been no exogenous shifts in the demand or supply respectively.
Although the prediction and the simulation assign each particular gender-education-
age-speci¯c skill-group in each year a speci¯c predicted or simulated value of the left-hand
side variable (i.e. earnings or labor force status), for the sake of exposition the results
are grouped and presented by gender and education only.44 Each plot includes four
series: the actual values, the in-sample predicted values, and the two sets of simulated
values. The ¯rst simulated series shows what would have happened had the demand
shifter stayed at its initial level over the entire period, the second series presents how
the variable would have evolved had there been no changes in one of the supply shifters,
namely the fraction of a skill-group in the population. The actual and the predicted
series show that the in-sample prediction is reasonably close to what actually happened
to earnings and labor force status for most of the education groups over the analyzed
period.
The results suggest that both demand and supply changes were in e®ect over the
period in all three countries. Two key trends in the exogenous changes of demand and
supply are common to the three countries. The distribution of the population across
the di®erent education groups shifted from the low educated towards the most educated:
the exogenous supply shifter de¯ned as the fraction of a skill-group in a population
was declining for the less educated and increased for the more educated. Other things
being equal, this development would have pushed wages or employment rates, as well
ass inactivity rates, across the di®erent skill-groups together. The exogenous demand
structure exhibited an opposite development: the demand shifter was falling for most
of the low-educated groups, while it was rising for the more educated. Had there been
no changes in the supply (i.e. no changes in the skill structure of the population) the
exogenous changes in the demand would have caused the wages and employment rates,
as well as the inactivity rates, across the di®erent skill-groups to further fan out. As
suggested above, the impact of the changes in the supply has been counteracted by
the impact of the changes at the demand side, going in the opposite direction. The
earnings and labor force status development for the respective education groups in the
three countries di®er only in the relative strength of the two factors.
43 The simulation is based on the reduced-form estimates from the speci¯cation which uses the mean
of the observed hourly wages. See Table C.3 in the Appendix for the estimation results. The mean of
the observed wages was chosen as the wage variable to allow a direct comparison of the predicted and
the simulated results with the actual series.
44 The values by gender and education are constructed as a weighted sum of the group-speci¯c (i.e.
gender-age-education) values, using relative population shares of di®erent age groups as weights.
28Figure B.7 shows that the demand factors dominated the evolution of the group-
speci¯c employment rates in France. This is true in particular for French men. The
counterfactual evidence predicted from the reduced-form model suggests that had the
demand structure stayed the same, employment of the more educated men would have
declined, while employment of the least-skilled men would have stayed more or less the
same. The employment rates across the education groups would have converged rather
than diverged. Had there been no change in the supply, the demand changes would have
a®ected the employment rates more drastically: the employment rate of the least skilled
would have declined more sharply and all the rates for the di®erent education groups
would have fanned out more broadly than they actually did. The increase in the fraction
of the most educated in the population was only partially absorbed by the favorable
demand changes for the high skilled. Although the results for French women are similar,
the demand shifts were less harmful and the supply shifts were more favorable among
low educated women, which explains why their employment rate remained at the same
level most of the time and even increased at the end of the period.
In the US, as shown on Figure B.10, demand factors dominated the evolution of
the employment rate of the low educated in the ¯rst half of the period, while supply
shifts were more important in the second half. Among the high educated, exogenous
changes in the supply more than mitigated the demand changes. The results for the US
show divergent developments of two education groups, namely the high school graduates
(ED3) against the high school graduates with some college or some further education
other than college (ED4). It is clear that the demand shifted away from the less educated
group towards individuals who had spent some time getting education after high school.
The ¯gure shows that these changes in the demand structure were almost perfectly
complemented by an opposite development at the supply side: the fraction of people with
some education after high school increased substantially, thus reducing the population
fraction of high school graduates. It is between these two groups that the e®ects of
the exogenous supply and demand changes reverse the sign, i.e. change the direction in
between the way they a®ect the low educated and the way they a®ect the high educated.
Figure B.13 shows that the adverse e®ect of the demand on the employment rate of
the low educated was more than mitigated by compensating changes in the supply. On
the other hand, an increase in the supply shifter of the most skilled partially counteracted
the favorable demand changes among these groups.
Overall, demand factors dominated the supply side e®ects in the development of
the employment rates in France, thus favoring the high educated and harming the low
educated: the employment rates among the low educated declined more than those of
the high educated. In the US, it was the exogenous changes in the supply that were
stronger. This resulted in a more rapid growth in employment rates among the low
educated and a slower growth of the employment rates among the high educated than
would have happened had there been only exogenous shifts in the demand. The impact
of the supply and the demand factors on the employment rates in the UK were more or
less balanced, with the supply e®ects dominating among the least and the most educated.
The simulated decline in the employment rate of the least educated was reversed by the
favorable supply changes, thus resulting in an increase of the employment rate among
the least skilled. The exogenously increasing supply of the high educated slowed down
29the growth of their employment rates, as driven by the favorable demand changes.
Inactivity rate increased among the low educated men and stagnated among the high-
educated men in France and the UK. Top panels of the Figures B.8 and B.14 show that
this development was driven by changes in the demand that reversed the e®ect of the
changes of the population's skill structure on the supply side. In the US as shown on
Figure B.11 the decrease in the inactivity rate of the least educated and the slow rise in
the inactivity rate among the high educated were clearly supply driven.
Figures B.12 and B.15 show that the e®ect of supply and demand changes on wages in
the US and the UK, as represented by the simulated counterfactual series, was negligible
in the face of the rise in the real hourly wage rates across all the education groups that
started around 1996 in the US and around 1999 in the UK. The overall wage increase
in the two countries can be attributed to the expansionary phase of the business cycle
but also to institutional changes in the minimum wage. In 1996, minimum wage was
increased in the US, after it had been held at the same level for a number of years.
In 1999, the UK enacted national minimum wage for the ¯rst time in history. Further
increases in the minimum wage followed in both countries. It seems likely that changes
in the minimum wage pushed the entire wage distributions upwards, although favoring
the most those with the lowest wages. Yet we can see, in particular among the high
educated in the UK, that the demand changes would have increased wages of the high
educated even more had it not been for the positive shifts in their supply. The opposite
holds for the less educated. In France, as shown on Figure B.9, real hourly wages across
all the education groups followed a much more cyclical pattern than in the other two
countries. Furthermore, it was the wages of the low educated that have eventually risen
the most, while the wage levels of the high educated stayed more or less the same, or even
declined. The eventual rise across all education categories coincides with the adoption of
the common European currency (EURO) in 1999. The e®ects of the exogenous demand
and supply shifts are much more visible here than in the other two countries. The ¯gure
suggests that the evolution of wages in France was dominated by the changes in the
supply rather than those in the demand. Had there been no exogenous changes in the
supply, the wages of the low educated would have increased less, and the wages of the
high educated would have ¯rst declined less and then increased more than they did.
The ¯gure also suggests that the wages of the least educated increased even more than
they would have according to the model if supply changes were exclusively at play. This
re°ects the e®ect of minimum wage and, possibly, collective bargaining that pushed the
wages at the bottom of the wage distribution up irrespective of the market forces.
In accord with both the reduced-form and the structural coe±cient estimates, the
simulation results provide some evidence for both the standard trade-o® hypothesis and
its extended version. The decline in the employment rate of the low educated in France
at a time when their relative and absolute wages were rising was the result of negative
demand shifts in the face of wages that were pushed up by institutions, rather than a
consequence of a negative supply shift. The e®ect of the shifts in supply that caused the
inactivity of the least educated in the US to decline could re°ect the fact that the low
educated were attracted to the labor force through the positive e®ect of these supply
changes on their wages. However, contrary to what the extended trade-o® hypothesis
would suggest, the increase in the inactivity rate among the low educated in France
30and the UK was demand driven, as suggested by the simulated counterfactual evidence,
despite the fact that the absolute and the relative wages in these groups increased. This
means that demand had a direct e®ect on inactivity in addition to the e®ect through
wages. As for the UK, this is in accord with the high wage elasticity of the labor supply,
which may imply that employment is more sensitive to the demand shocks than wages.
As for France, however, this e®ect cannot be explained by the simple labor supply and
labor demand model estimated in the present analysis.45 This suggests that other factors
might have caused these developments, including for example the early retirement policies
aimed at reducing unemployment or a discouraged worker phenomenon, features that are
not part of the theoretical model presented here.
6 Conclusion
The trade-o® hypothesis states that high wage inequality in the US and the UK and
high unemployment in countries of continental Europe are the consequence of the same
negative change in the demand for the low skilled under di®erent degree of wage rigidity.
We estimate a model of labor supply and labor demand for di®erent skill-groups to test
the validity of the trade-o® hypothesis for the labor market developments in France, the
US, and the UK over the 1990s. The theoretical framework builds on the model from
Card et al. (1999), which is extended and estimated in its complete structural form. The
results are used to analyze the e®ect of market forces (exogenous changes in the labor
supply and labor demand) under di®erent degree of wage rigidity on the developments in
relative earnings and labor force status proportions of the di®erent skill-groups in these
three countries.
In addition, we propose an extended version of the trade-o® hypothesis suggesting
that, if labor force participation is not perfectly wage inelastic, wage inequality is likely
to be accompanied by high inactivity rates, in particular among the low skilled. The
trade-o® the policy-makers face is then one between wage inequality as well as high
inactivity on one hand, and high unemployment on the other.
A system of the three equations for group-speci¯c wage, employment rate and labor
supply, implied by the structural model, is estimated with two-way ¯xed e®ects, by
both linear and non-linear least squares to obtain the reduced-form and the structural
coe±cients respectively. We propose several tests of the trade-o® hypothesis and its
extended version, based on both sets of coe±cients.
The reduced-form results con¯rm the validity of the trade-o® hypothesis and its
extended version when France is compare to the US but have mixed results for the UK.
Wages are more sensitive than employment to the demand shocks in the US, while the
opposite is true for France, as well as the UK. Cross-country comparison also shows
that the demand shock sensitivity of wages is higher, while sensitivity of employment
is lower in the US than in the other two countries. However, the demand shock a®ects
employment and labor supply in exactly the same way in both the US and the UK,
45 The observed reduction in employment among the low-skilled men in France saw corresponding
increases in inactivity rather than unemployment.
31suggesting wages are °exible in the two countries. The contradictory reduced-form
results for the UK are reconciled by the structural estimation, which shows that both
labor supply and labor demand are signi¯cantly more wage elastic in the UK than in the
two other countries, and explains the observed insensitivity of wages and sensitivity of
employment in this country.
Structural results provide further evidence in favor of the hypothesis. The estimate
of the parameter of the degree of wage rigidity seems to con¯rm that wages in France are
less °exible than wages in the US and the UK, and that wage rigidity in France a®ected
the development of wages and labor force status proportions in the French economy
during the analyzed period. We also ¯nd positive and signi¯cant wage elasticity of labor
force participation in all three countries which suggests that the high inactivity rates in
the US and the UK, in particular among the low skilled, are likely to be a consequence
of their decreasing relative wages, as proposed by the extended trade-o® hypothesis.
The simulations based on the estimated model reveal that demand as well as supply
changes were in e®ect in all three countries during the 1990s. The three countries saw
the same overall trend in the demand and the supply structures. The distribution
of the population across the di®erent education groups shifted from the low-educated
towards the high-educated, thus increasing the supply of the high skilled and reducing
the supply of the low skilled. The impact of the supply shifts was counteracted by
the impact of changes on the demand side that were going in the opposite direction,
as the exogenous forces further shifted the demand away from the low-educated groups
and towards the high-educated. The earnings and labor force status development for the
respective education groups in the three countries was determined by the relative strength
of these on-going shifts in the supply and the demand. The simulated counterfactual
series suggest that the exogenous shifts in the demand dominated for the employment
rates across the education groups in France, while in the US it was supply shifts that
had more impact. The mutually opposite e®ects of the supply and the demand shifts in
the UK were of similar magnitudes, with the supply e®ects dominating for the least and
the most educated. Inactivity rates were driven by changes in the demand in France and
the UK, while supply changes played the more substantial role in the US.
Overall, we conclude that in addition to the identi¯ed cross-country di®erences in the
relative strength of the shifts in the supply and the demand, both the trade-o® hypothesis
and its extended version have substantial explanatory power when the relative labor
market outcomes across the di®erent skill-groups are compared between France and the
US, as well as between France and the UK over the 1990s.
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A Data Description and Sources
The three national labor force surveys used in the present analysis are Enqu^ ete Emploi
(1990-2002) for France, Labor Force Survey (1993-2002) for the UK, and the March CPS
(1990-2002) for the US.46 All three datasets have a character of a short rotational panel,
so that a fraction of the individuals overlaps in two consecutive years. As the present
analysis utilizes a panel of grouped data with the groups based on age, the panel nature
of the individual data is ignored and all the individuals are treated as newly randomly
sampled in each year. The sample employed in the analysis is the non-institutionalized
population between the ages of 25 and 54, excluding students, conscripts and individuals
in Armed Forces. The analysis makes use of all these individuals in the datasets regardless
whether they come form the same household or not. In this sense, intra-household
correlations are ignored. However, for the construction of the group-level information for
the skill-groups, treating all the individuals as independent seems to be rather innocuous,
and substantially increases the sample size. The skill-groups are classi¯ed on the basis
of gender, six age ranges (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54), and six (¯ve in
the UK) education attainment categories, leading to 72 groups in total for France and
the US, and 60 for the UK.
The use of the UK Labor Force Survey requires more detailed description. It is a
quarterly survey that follows households for 5 consecutive quarters. In each quarter, one
¯fth of the households leave the sample and is replaced by a new wave. Although the
questions asked in each quarter are almost the same, information about earnings is only
available in the quarter when the households are in the survey for the last time (i.e. only
for the outgoing wave).47 The present analysis therefore uses the outgoing households
in each quarter over a particular year to constructs a new dataset, which is than used to
construct the group-level information for that year. In this sense, the UK grouped data
is not directly comparable with the data from the other two countries which are more
or less a point in time estimates (both surveys are conducted in Spring), whereas it is
four points in time in di®erent quarters of the year in the UK. This should be irrelevant
for wage information which does not show much variation over the year, but could a®ect
the labor force survey statistics, as employment does show some seasonality over the
year. For now, this problem is neglected in the analysis. However, as the data in the
UK is constructed in the same way in all years, and this analysis uses the ¯xed e®ect
estimation that is based on the year-to-year di®erences, the problem should not have an
impact on the estimation results. On the other hand, the summary statistics presented
in the ¯gures may be a®ected by this method of the data construction. The sample size
and the size of the skill-groups is summarized in Table A.1.
Education is classi¯ed to best ¯t the country-speci¯c characteristics of the education
system, as well as to produce reasonably large group-sizes over the entire period. In the
46 Missing wage information in earlier years of the LFS for the UK requires the analysis to start only
in 1993 for this country.
47 The information about earnings is asked also in the second interview starting from 1997.
36Table A.1: The Sample and Skill-Group Size Statistics
country years individual obs no. of skill group obs smallest largest
(all years) groups (all years) group size group size
FR 1990-2002 934 719 72 936 150 2704
UK 1993-2002 458 107 60 600 168 2096
USA 1990-2002 864 323 72 936 176 3196
UK the classi¯cation is as follows: 1 = \CSE below grade 1 or equivalent" (less than O-
levels), 2 = \GCSE A-C or equivalent" (less than A-levels), 3 = \A level or equivalent",
4 = \higher education, below degree", 5 = \degree or higher". In France it is: 1 = \CEP
or less" (primary), 2 = \BEPC" (junior high school), 3 = \CAP, BEP" (vocational
or technical school) , 4 = \Baccalaur¶ eat" (academic high school), 5 = \undergraduate
degree", 6 = \graduate degree". In the US, it is: 1 = \8th grade or below", 2 = \up to
12th grade, no diploma", 3 = \high-school graduate or equivalent", 4 = \some college
but no degree, Associate's degree in college", 5 = \Bachelor's Degree", 6 = \Master's
Degree and above".
The employment and the labor force participation rates are de¯ned in the standard
way: Employed individuals include the employed and the self-employed, as well as
the unpaid family workers, and labor force participants are individuals who are either
employed or unemployed (according to the ILO de¯nition of unemployment).
The key measure the present analysis uses for earnings is the real hourly wage. In
France, the hourly wage was constructed using the reported monthly wages from the
previous month divided by 4.33 times the reported usual hours of work. In the UK, the
hourly wage was already present in the dataset, constructed by the data providers using
the reported current weekly wages and usual hours of work. In the US, hourly wage
was constructed from the annual wage from the previous year, using the reported weeks
worked in the previous year multiplied by the usual weekly hours of work. The reported
hours of work per week were ¯rst trimmed (separately by gender and year) at the 1st and
99th percentile to avoid the outliers and top coded values, before used to construct the
hourly wage. The resulting hourly wages were trimmed at the 5th and 95th percentile
(separately by year and within each skill-group) for the same reason.
The consumption de°ators for the period come from the o±cial statistical sites of
the three countries: Personal Consumption Expenditure De°ator from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis for the US, IPC (Indice des prix µ a la consommation) from INSEE
(French Statistical National Institute) for France, and CPI index (all items) from Na-
tional Statistics in the UK. All three indices are normalized to have a base in 1995.
The value added shares of the individual industries used in the construction of the
demand shifter come from the STAN Indicators database produced by OECD. There are
25 industry groups in the US, 24 in the UK, and 23 in France. The number of industries
37depends on the extent to which the national industry classi¯cations in the individual
level datasets correspond to the ISIC Rev.3 classi¯cation in the STAN database.
The exogenous supply side shifters are constructed as follows. Marital status describes
the actual cohabitation (rather than the legal status), as it is assumed that cohabitation
is likely to involve consumption and expenses sharing and income pooling, which are
the key aspects a®ecting labor supply behavior. In the US, it is de¯ned as \married
with spouse present"48, in the UK as \married with spouse present OR cohabitate" and
in France as \cohabitate" (both married or not). The presence-of-children variable is
de¯ned as the presence of pre-school (less than 6 year old in the US and France, and
less than 5 year old in the UK) children in the household. The information therefore
does not necessarily describe individual's own children. It is not always possible to link
children to their parents in the three datasets. Besides, this information may actually be
preferable, as the presence children that require child-care can in principal a®ect labor
supply behavior of any member of the household.
B Figures
48 Unfortunately, in the US dataset it is not possible to distinguish individuals that are not married
but are living together.


































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.















































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.

































































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.














































































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.











































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.









































































































































































































































































































Out of school civilian prime age (24-54) population in France, the UK and the US. ED1 is the least
educated group. Data is weighted by survey weights to re°ect the population means.
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Women by Education
The six plots correspond to the six education groups, with ED1 being the least and ED6 the most
educated. Each plot shows actual values, in-sample predicted values and two sets of simulated values.
The \S-shock" and the \D-shock" series present the predicted values when the demand shifter or the
¯rst supply shifter (i.e. the fraction of the skill-group in the population) are held constant at their initial
year values respectively.
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The six plots correspond to the ¯ve education groups, with ED1 being the least and ED5 the most
educated. Each plot shows actual values, in-sample predicted values and two sets of simulated values.
The \S-shock" and the \D-shock" series present the predicted values when the demand shifter or the
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53C Other Estimation Results
Table C.1: Reduced-Form Results I
Variable France US UK
W ln popshare -0.033 (0.023) -0.058¤ (0.025) -0.017 (0.023)
D shifter 0.034y (0.018) 0.086¤¤ (0.019) 0.038y (0.019)
married F -0.374¤¤ (0.108) -0.254y (0.128) 0.548¤¤ (0.136)
married M -0.260¤¤ (0.097) 1.056¤¤ (0.164) 0.761¤¤ (0.060)
child6 F 0.032 (0.111) 0.383¤ (0.152) -0.109y (0.063)
child6 M 0.087 (0.084) -0.780¤¤ (0.193) -0.075 (0.049)
E ln popshare 0.005 (0.019) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.047¤ (0.021)
D shifter 0.077¤¤ (0.019) 0.018 (0.020) 0.118¤¤ (0.027)
married F -0.263¤ (0.105) 0.117 (0.146) 0.104 (0.086)
married M 0.261¤¤ (0.087) 0.385¤¤ (0.103) 0.086y (0.044)
child6 F -0.073 (0.090) -0.351¤ (0.175) -0.357¤¤ (0.044)
child6 M 0.106¤ (0.049) 0.283y (0.148) 0.001 (0.031)
LS ln popshare -0.011 (0.015) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.020 (0.019)
D shifter 0.065¤¤ (0.016) 0.036y (0.021) 0.101¤¤ (0.026)
married F -0.330¤¤ (0.070) 0.061 (0.133) -0.062 (0.080)
married M 0.221¤¤ (0.074) 0.425¤¤ (0.088) -0.036 (0.030)
child6 F -0.112¤ (0.055) -0.329¤ (0.145) -0.299¤¤ (0.045)
child6 M -0.030 (0.036) 0.134 (0.131) 0.030 (0.020)
N 2808 2808 1800
R2 0.25 0.174 0.397
F¦
(18;71) 14.31 10.38 68.26
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
¦ In the case of the UK, the value of the F-statistic is for F(18;29).
Wage constructed as the median of the observed and predicted wages.
C.1 Omitting the Marital Status and the Presence of Pre-school Age
Children
As mentioned before, it may be argued that the two supply shifters, marital status
and presence of pre-school age children are not exogenous to the model. We therefore
re-estimate the model without the two variables. Tables C.4 and C.5 in the Appendix
present the results of this sensitivity analysis. Our main ¯ndings prove to be independent
of the presence of the two variables in the model. On the contrary, they reveal even
54Table C.2: Reduced-Form Results II
Variable France US UK
W ln popshare -0.052¤ (0.022) -0.030 (0.018) -0.016 (0.027)
D shifter 0.033¤ (0.016) 0.066¤¤ (0.014) 0.007 (0.021)
married F -0.229¤ (0.098) 0.017 (0.075) 0.587¤¤ (0.097)
married M -0.221¤ (0.098) 0.749¤¤ (0.106) 0.835¤¤ (0.067)
child6 F 0.005 (0.108) 0.217y (0.115) 0.011 (0.061)
child6 M 0.134y (0.076) -0.444¤¤ (0.144) -0.057 (0.055)
E ln popshare 0.005 (0.019) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.047¤ (0.021)
D shifter 0.077¤¤ (0.019) 0.018 (0.020) 0.118¤¤ (0.027)
married F -0.263¤ (0.105) 0.117 (0.146) 0.104 (0.086)
married M 0.261¤¤ (0.087) 0.385¤¤ (0.103) 0.086y (0.044)
child6 F -0.073 (0.090) -0.351¤ (0.175) -0.357¤¤ (0.044)
child6 M 0.106¤ (0.049) 0.283y (0.148) 0.001 (0.031)
LS ln popshare -0.011 (0.015) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.020 (0.019)
D shifter 0.065¤¤ (0.016) 0.036y (0.021) 0.101¤¤ (0.026)
married F -0.330¤¤ (0.070) 0.061 (0.133) -0.062 (0.080)
married M 0.221¤¤ (0.074) 0.425¤¤ (0.088) -0.036 (0.030)
child6 F -0.112¤ (0.055) -0.329¤ (0.145) -0.299¤¤ (0.045)
child6 M -0.030 (0.036) 0.134 (0.131) 0.030 (0.020)
N 2808 2808 1800
R2 0.272 0.137 0.451
F¦
(18;71) 14.05 10.1 90.85
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
¦ In the case of the UK, the value of the F-statistic is for F(18;29).
Wage constructed as the mean of the observed and predicted wages.
55Table C.3: Reduced-Form Results III
Variable France US UK
W ln popshare -0.064¤ (0.026) -0.018 (0.018) -0.038 (0.039)
D shifter 0.019 (0.020) 0.044¤ (0.017) -0.013 (0.026)
married F -0.327¤¤ (0.108) 0.107 (0.074) 0.513¤¤ (0.148)
married M 0.003 (0.109) 0.585¤¤ (0.088) 0.920¤¤ (0.088)
child6 F 0.004 (0.113) 0.169 (0.105) 0.188y (0.108)
child6 M 0.113 (0.087) -0.203 (0.127) -0.003 (0.069)
E ln popshare 0.005 (0.019) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.047¤ (0.021)
D shifter 0.077¤¤ (0.019) 0.018 (0.020) 0.118¤¤ (0.027)
married F -0.263¤ (0.105) 0.117 (0.146) 0.104 (0.086)
married M 0.261¤¤ (0.087) 0.385¤¤ (0.103) 0.086y (0.044)
child6 F -0.073 (0.090) -0.351¤ (0.175) -0.357¤¤ (0.044)
child6 M 0.106¤ (0.049) 0.283y (0.148) 0.001 (0.031)
LS ln popshare -0.011 (0.015) -0.072¤ (0.028) -0.020 (0.019)
D shifter 0.065¤¤ (0.016) 0.036y (0.021) 0.101¤¤ (0.026)
married F -0.330¤¤ (0.070) 0.061 (0.133) -0.062 (0.080)
married M 0.221¤¤ (0.074) 0.425¤¤ (0.088) -0.036 (0.030)
child6 F -0.112¤ (0.055) -0.329¤ (0.145) -0.299¤¤ (0.045)
child6 M -0.030 (0.036) 0.134 (0.131) 0.030 (0.020)
N 2808 2808 1800
R2 0.273 0.108 0.444
F¦
(18;71) 15.11 9.2 101.2
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
¦ In the case of the UK, the value of the F-statistic is for F(18;29).
Wage constructed as the mean of the observed wages.
56stronger evidence for the trade-o® hypothesis. The only exception are the reduced-form
results for the estimation of the wage equation for the UK. The two coe±cients of the
group's share in the population and of the demand shifter are both signi¯cant but have
opposite signs (contrary to the expectations) when marital status and presence of pre-
school age children are omitted from the model. Our conjecture is that this surprising
result is due to the fact that the two factors serve also as a proxy for a more detailed age
categorization than captured by the group ¯xed e®ects in the case of the UK. Namely,
although the strati¯cation of the groups in the UK uses the same six age categories as
in the other two countries, the ¯xed e®ects - to avoid over-parametrization of the model
- vary only by three broader age categories.
Table C.4: Reduced-Form Results - - Exogenous Supply Shifters Omitted
Variable France US UK
W ln popshare -0.028 (0.023) -0.059y (0.031) 0.136¤¤ (0.040)
D shifter 0.022 (0.018) 0.090¤¤ (0.021) -0.080¤ (0.037)
E ln popshare 0.001 (0.021) -0.073¤ (0.030) -0.045 (0.027)
D shifter 0.080¤¤ (0.017) 0.020 (0.021) 0.105¤¤ (0.036)
LS ln popshare -0.013 (0.017) -0.074¤ (0.030) -0.047y (0.025)
D shifter 0.064¤¤ (0.015) 0.038y (0.023) 0.112¤¤ (0.033)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Group wage is constructed as median of the observed and predicted wages.
Table C.5: Structural Results - Exogenous Supply Shifters Omitted
France US UK
½ 0.796¤¤ (0.010) 0.833¤¤ (0.016) 0.834¤¤ (0.015)
¾ 1.901¤¤ (0.033) 1.886¤¤ (0.066) 2.230¤¤ (0.086)
² 0.178¤¤ (0.055) 0.150¤ (0.071) 0.295¤¤ (0.091)
Signi¯cance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Group wage is constructed as median of the observed and predicted wages.
57D Model Details
D.1 Correspondences between the structure and the reduced form
This part states the other correspondences between the structure and the reduced form,
in addition to the ones given in Table 1. There are J (number of groups) group-speci¯c
¯xed e®ects in each of the three equations which correspond to the structural parameters
as follows
¼w

















There are T (number of years) year-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects in each of the three equations
which correspond to the structural parameters as follows
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When the demand shifter ~ cjt is used instead of the unobserved relative coe±cient cjt,
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The system of structural equations is given by
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This system simpli¯es to (omitting the time subscripts)
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The way the model is set up and the substantial number of parameters (including the
group and the year e®ects as described in the Section D.1) makes the traditional proof
of identi¯cation through the rank and order conditions rather complicated. Therefore in
what follows, I use an easier method of step by step description of how the key structural
parameters could be recovered from particular reduced-form estimates.
The key structural parameters can be inferred for example as follows. The ratio of
the coe±cient of the proportion of the group in the population from the labor force
participation equation to the same coe±cient in the wage equation gives the wage
elasticity of labor supply.49 The ratio of the coe±cient of the presence of pre-school
children for women in the employment equation to the one in the wage equation can be
used to calculate ¾. The coe±cient of the group's proportion within the population in
the wage equation and the previous estimates of " and ¾ enable to construct ½. The
four structural coe±cients of the exogenous labor supply shifters can be recovered for
example from the reduced-form estimates from the wage equation alone: They are equal
to the ratio of the respective gender-speci¯c coe±cients of the variables describing marital
status and children, and the coe±cient of the proportion of the group in the population.
The coe±cient of the instrument of the relative e±ciency (¸) is minus the ratio of the
demand shifter and the population fraction coe±cients from the wage equation, divided
by (¾ ¡ 1). We can plug in the expression for ¾ as derived before. All the formulas are
summarized below.
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Alternatively, " and ½ can be derived for example from any two of the coe±cients from the
wage equation, once the other parameters are derived as above. In this way, estimation
of only wage and employment equations is su±cient for the identi¯cation.
E Estimation Details
E.1 Prediction of the Unobserved Wages
In the preferred speci¯cation, the group speci¯c wage is constructed as mean or median of
wages of all the individuals in the group. In this case wages for the individuals for which
the wage information is missing must be imputed. The analysis predicts wages to people
with missing wage information using the traditional two-equation model of Heckman.
The following wage equation is estimated along with the employment equation to account
for the potential selection to employment based on unobservable characteristics.
ln(wi) = Xi¯ + "i
Ii = Zi° + Ài
"i and Ài have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and covariance matrix §,
wi is individual's i wage and Ii is a zero/one indicator function specifying whether wage
is observed for the individual i or not.
The two equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood. Sample probability
weights were used in the estimation. The right-hand-side variables in the wage equation
(Xi) are age, age squared, dummy variables for the six (¯ve in the UK) education
categories, ethnicity,50 immigration status (stating whether the individual was born in
another country), and an indicator whether the individual is full-time employed. The
exclusion restrictions (variables that are in the selection equation but not in the wage
equation) are the marital/cohabitating status and the presence of pre-school age children
50 This variable is not present in the French dataset and therefore is not used in the estimation for
France.
60in the household. The model is estimated separately for men and women, and the
estimation is done by year. The model is used to predict wages to individuals for which
wages are unobserved.
F Extensions of Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999)
The theoretical model in this paper is a variation of that in Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux
(1999). However, in contrast with their application that focuses on a single long term
change in wages and employment over the entire decade of 1980s (focusing on France,
Canada and the US), we apply an extended version of their model to the year-to-year
changes observed in the panel data of di®erent skill-groups in France, the UK and the
US over the 1990s. The key di®erences between the two papers, both in the model and
in its application, are discussed below.
F.1 Theoretical Extensions
There are two key di®erences between our model and the one in Card, Kramarz, and
Lemieux (1999). The ¯rst di®erence is the presence of the third equation. Card et
al. (1999) write down only the wage and labor supply equations, and they use the
employment rate for the estimation of the latter. However, the equality of employment
and labor supply holds only in the case of full wage °exibility (½ = 1), i.e. when the
markets clear.51 Using their theoretical framework without the assumption of full wage
°exibility leads to a third equation, similar to the one presented here, that describes
labor supply as observationally distinct from the employment rate due to the presence
of unemployment. In addition, the estimation of the labor supply equation enables
us (within the framework of the same model) to account for the observed labor force
participation and inactivity rates, which is important for the extended version of the
trade-o® hypothesis.
The other di®erence between the model of Card et al. (1999) and the one presented
here is the use of the \true" supply shifters, i.e. marital status and the presence of
pre-school age children. Card et al. (1999) use the population share as the only proxy
for exogenous shifts in the labor supply. However, this term enters the model when the
labor demand equation is transformed from levels to proportions (the step from equation
2 to 3), and is therefore an \in-built" accounting feature of the model. Using the true
supply shifters as well as the demand shifter, as done in this analysis, should improve
the identi¯cation of the model.
Besides the above mentioned theoretical di®erences (including the broader set of tests
of the trade-o® hypothesis and the proposition and tests of its extended version), there
are many other distinctive features of the estimation methodology employed in this paper
which will be discussed next.
51 In this respect it holds that if wages are not perfectly °exible, the estimated coe±cients are also
given an incorrect structural interpretation.
61F.2 New Empirical Application
As mentioned above, while Card et al. (1999) focus on the long-term developments
between two data points from the 1980s, the present analysis captures the year-to-year
changes over the 1990s. The di®erent nature of the data used in the two papers implies
the diverse estimation strategies they employ: Card et al. (1999) estimate the model
using a cross-section of the ¯rst di®erences over an entire decade, whereas here it is
estimated on an annual panel of skill-groups over the period of 10 to 13 years.
The two papers use di®erent sets of exogenous shocks in order to identify the labor
supply and the labor demand: as mentioned above, while Card et al. (1999) include
only the group's share in the population as the supply shifter, the present analysis
also employs marital status and the presence of pre-school age children. In terms of
the demand shifter, Card et al. (1999) focus speci¯cally on the shocks that are due
to technological progress and choose as their proxy the proportion of individuals who
use computer at work at the end of the period. They also use initial wage level as an
alternative proxy for changes in the demand. The demand shifter in the present work
does not assume a particular source of the demand shock. It is constructed as a measure
of the previous year productivity of each skill-group, and should therefore be closer to
the actual unobserved relative e±ciency parameter cjt it is supposed to represent.
In contrast with Card et al.(1999) who estimate their model separately by gender,
our analysis uses all the skill-groups together in the estimation. As the theoretical model
(although very stylized) is designed to describe the whole economy, and as it is likely
that there is a non-zero substitution between men and women in many economic areas,
we prefer to use both sexes jointly in the estimation of the model.
The model does not distinguish between individuals of di®erent ethnicity or im-
migration status, the reason being the absence of relevant comparable variable with
this information in all three datasets.52 The empirical analysis therefore ignores any
race-based or immigration-based discrimination at the demand side as well as race or
immigration heterogeneity in preferences at the supply side. We consider this approach
to be preferable to the exclusive focus on Whites for the US sample (or potentially for
the UK), as done in Card et al. (1999). The reason is, again, that the model is designed
to describe the whole economy with all individuals and all subgroups.53
52 The French dataset does not include a variable with information about ethnicity, and the US dataset
lacks any immigration status information for the early years of the analysis.
53 The ethnicity and immigration status variables are used, where available, for the prediction of wages
in the Heckman procedure.
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